A successful technologist who transferred from within, a startup company founder who moved from university research to Microsoft, a venture investor, and an open source evangelist gathered recently for a roundtable discussion of key questions and lessons learned. The discussion ranged from what makes it work, how to measure the benefits, surprises, and whether they would do it again. While everyone in the group had a different experience, they were largely in agreement around the key issues of technology transfer and all agreed that they would gladly do it again.
A successful technologist who transferred from within, a startup company founder who moved from university research to Microsoft, a venture investor, and an open source evangelist gathered recently for a roundtable discussion of key questions and lessons learned. The discussion ranged from what makes it work, how to measure the benefits, surprises, and whether they would do it again. While everyone in the group had a different experience, they were largely in agreement around the key issues of technology transfer and all agreed that they would gladly do it again.
How do research teams successfully manage the transition to real-world products and services?
Eric O'Brien: First, the success of the tech transfer transition starts before the research is performed. The research ought to be looking to solve problems that are currently unsolved or that are predicted-by the researcher or by others-to be in need of solving. I'm tempted to say, "for a large number of eventual users," but that type of answer precludes transfers internal to organizations that want to keep a solution proprietary or the "one of a kind"-type customers typified by the US intelligence community.
Second, the stakeholders-let's call them recipients-who may be taking ownership of the technology post-transfer need to see value in the tech for their business or mission. I've found the best way to show a recipient the value is to create a fielded prototype or solution, to actually demonstrate the value to that user. Then have prototype users tell the recipient that they want to purchase or use this technology. Typically, recipients can "get" the market size for the tech-they know their market and can tell how many users there are or will be.
Last, presuming that the recipient represents To know this, r e s e a r c h e r s must interact in strong collaborative ways with subject matter experts from private industry-the practitioners, the boots on the ground warriors who truly understand the real-world issues. Their input is important as to the direction in which a company should skate to stay ahead of the hockey puck.
William Arbaugh: Beyond the obvious factors of a great team and idea, I think that luck and flexibility are incredibly important in achieving a successful transition. You can't make luck, but you can prepare for it. For instance, you might find yourself in front of a potential investor or buyer serendipitously. If you can't explain your value proposition in a few minutes, you won't get another chance. Similarly, you have to be flexible. I consulted for a start-up once that had an offer from a Fortune 100 company. The buyer wanted the founders to drop one aspect of their product as a precondition to the deal. The founders refused, and the company ultimately went bankrupt. It's good to stay true to your vision sometimes, but you need to carefully weigh the consequences of not changing when needed.
John Sebes: Eric is right that picking a problem with tech transfer in mind is very helpful, but because that doesn't happen often-or the pick is based on assumptions no longer valid at tech transfer time-we should look at those times when tech transfer time creeps up and you say, "Now what?" One approach that has some empirical value is a champion or evangelist. If a team is very lucky, one of its members can grow into this role, actively generating ideas -and talking a lot about "what our stuff is good for. " In other cases, it might be possible to bring on a person specifically for this role, as they do on some research projects at SRI. Or it could be an advisor who is an advocate.
But without at least one person who gets genuinely passionate about the problem of finding two or three actionable answers to "What is our stuff good for?" then the team as a whole never really catches fire with tech transfer except as a chore. Ultimately, some of these candidate answers have to drive somebody to find people who might resemble actual customers, talk to them, and do some thinking about who would pay for a solution X to problem Y if we can craft our tech Z into an X. Coming up dry doesn't mean no tech transfer, but it means that this group of people are going to be challenged in terms of for-profit tech transfer.
Are there particular aspects of security/privacy that make problems easier or harder to address? Rodriguez: I see both aspects of security and privacy continuing to be challenging issues for the near future. Privacy will continue to loom large and become an increasingly concerning matter for the American citizen. It might even become more important to Americans than cybersecurity as we seem to have increasingly less privacy, not more.
Arbaugh: I'm not exactly sure if you're asking if our problems are more technically difficult than other areas or make transferring the technology more difficult. I'll answer the latter.
Security is a cost center. As a result, CIOs will only invest if they feel there is a need-or should I say fear. This is how antivirus, firewalls, and all of the first-generation security products became must haves.
The latest spin about advanced persistent threats-a term I hate-is driving the second generation of security products. The need/fear level still isn't high enough 20-word pull quote. -William Arbaugh to make them must haves, but it's getting there quick. Fundamentally, it isn't clear that second-generation security products will be priced low enough for small and medium-sized businesses to afford them.
Sebes: I agree, but let me add that security is very often anti-negative-a downside preventer, not a creator of value. Any research in security that's based on defensive or palliative approaches will be limited in terms of value that the tech can create in the marketplace.
On the other hand, I think that we've ridden the technical risk reduction curve pretty far down and to the right. More security tech isn't more incremental security benefit. The whole ATP thing shows how systemic security has a huge people factor and perhaps also a factor of technical controls on what hapless people can do. Monitoring and tracking-and maybe tech for advising and handling user activity in risky areas-could do some good there. But that brings up privacy as something to deal with, and it's also heavy in human interaction, not something that most security researchers like.
Privacy is a different beast. A huge ecosystem is growing around personal data aggregation, anonymization, mining, and so on. I can see a lot of positive value created around tech to increase the armature of data collection and big data analysis, while also protecting privacy or enabling a person to undo some anonymization-uniquely, of course-when analysis makes someone want to pay for the identity information of an anonymous person turned up via big data analysis.
Unfortunately, this type of privacy-related research isn't the kind of privacy I normally see associated with security research. But maybe I'm out of touch.
How do you measure or evaluate the return on investment (ROI) for security technologies?
O'Brien: I've tried a number of times to quantify a dollar amount of ROI that implementing a security technology will bring. At best, I've found that you can give guidelines about the reduced security risk. So, attempting to justify a tech transfer on a security technology likely won't be done based on traditional ROI. The value the recipient ought to be able to market-test is "Will this technology create a distinctive competence?"-something either saleable by itself or that adds a distinctive competence for an existing solution.
Rodriguez: I believe having a strong understanding of market opportunities can help evaluate ROI. Gaining knowledge from industry CISOs will provide significant business intelligence as to where the most critical gaps and needs are. Having this knowledge is one form of measuring ROI. Does the solution address a highly critical need that industry professionals are having a hard time solving? Can the solution provide secure, trusted, resilient, reliable, and trusted results and at the same time deliver ROI? Can the technology be integrated seamlessly and easily, and create greater trusted efficiencies that lead to increased revenue and shareholder value? Does the technology significantly reduce risk to threats and attacks? If so, over time, the ROI will be evaluated as positive.
Arbaugh: As I said, security is a cost center, and we'll never be able to demonstrate an ROI. Case in point, I'm on the advisory board for Niometrics PTE. It started out building a second-generation firewall by doing fast software-based d e e p -pac k e t inspection and layer 7 classification. It does it well: close to 98 percent classification rate. You'd think it would get market traction from a security standpoint, but it hasn't. Instead, it's getting tremendous traction from a business intelligence standpoint from ISPs and cellular providers. Why? There's a real ROI with the latter and not with security.
Sebes: There's no ROI for anti-negative security solutions, no more than there is for other infrastructure costs. There's value in compliance, of course, but that's checking a box, not creating a revenue equivalent. Truly innovative security that creates measurable value is rare enough that I don't have any rule of thumb for ROI. Relating privacy and data mining, the value is simply a function of the market value of information created through data mining-no ROI calculator.
I'll take Bill's point, though, and stress the lemonade from the lemon. Sometimes people invent some cool stuff in security, but the best place to create value from the innovation isn't in security. It comes down to the quality of the team to think out of the box and suppose that their uber-firewall technology is better as the basis for business intelligence. Thinking about the application of the new tech's ROI that's most obvious to a security researcher probably isn't the right way to think about ROI. Rodriguez: What are the largest pain points, and are there technologies currently available to address this need? The cyber world has many, and they change every several months. This dynamic market makes it harder to predict, but because cybersecurity is a relatively immature market, there are many opportunities to build solutions that can impact myriad problem sets.
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Market dynamics are a good barometer. Aside from the increased frequency and sophistication of attacks, you should look at outside influencers:
■ hottest merger and aquisition market for three years and growing; ■ more public-private partnership models growing across the country; ■ academic institutions building cybersecurity curriculums; ■ venture capitalists funding cybersecurity companies at an increasing rate; ■ private equity firms investing in the cyber market when five years ago, they were not; ■ shortage of cybersecurity subject matter experts; ■ cybersecurity being imbedded in business technology process tools; ■ the industry being regulated; and ■ number of cybersecurity legislative bills on Capitol Hill up to 55 from zero.
Cybersecurity will have a horizontal and vertical market opportunity and will be the market differentiator. Why? Because critical infrastructure owners will demand to be trusted, resilient, reliant, safe, and secure.
Arbaugh: I'm not sure there's a sure-fire way here. Otherwise, everyone would be a great investor. Instinct, and vision-neither can be quantified, but both make the difference.
The way I came up with the idea for my current company is that when I spoke to people about what I wanted to do, most said it was impossible. That's exactly the same reaction I had with my last company. So perhaps that's the answer: do something that most people think is impossible! Sebes: I think that there's rough consensus about a core of really hard problems in technology including security and a penumbra of issues that many though not most regard as hard. Nibbling off a concrete corner of a hard problem is a good indicator. Something that's incremental is a bad indicator. But that leaves out a lot in the middle that I don't have an indicator for. But also I think humility is very important.
The team's quality and maturity is hugely important-a dysfunctional tech team can't transfer anything. And I think that humility is an important part of a team culture, to keep in mind what you know you don't know, and to work toward several tech transfer opportunities without thinking that you know enough to really predict.
One other thing to consider is open source. Sometimes, there are innovations that capitalistic tech transfer isn't going to work for. If a team really believes that this is the case for their tech, then they need to find the communities of people who will benefit and start treating them as customers for their research. Just look at the host of open source security widgets that the Department of Homeland Security's Homeland Open Security Technology [HOST] is tracking. If a team gets on this track during research, I see a good likelihood that tech transfer will happen.
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